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
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






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RELATION
OF THE
SIEGE OF TARRAGONA.



RELATION

OF THE

SIEGE OF TARRAGONA,

AND THE

STORMING

AND

CAPTURE OF THAT CITY BY THE FRENCH,

IN JUNE, 1811.

BY FIELD MARSHAL

DON JUAN SENEN DE CONTRERAS,

Governor of that Fortress at the time of the Siege.

WITH

PARTICULARS OF THE GENERAL'S ESCAPE FROM THE
STRONG CASTLE IN WHICH HE WAS CONFINED,

HIS

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE,

AND

The Nature, Stratagems, and Resources of the French Government, &c.

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
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
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Prof. Louis C. Karpovich
5-18-45

EXPLANATION OF THE PLATE.

*Sketch of the Part of Tarragona and its Works,
which were attacked by the French during the
Siege of that place, in the Months of May and
June, 1811.*

y y y—Francoli River.

s—Francoli Fort.

t, u—Traverses destroyed by the Commander-in-
Chief's orders.

n—Prince's Half-moon

&—Battery of St. Joseph.

z—Traverse extending from the bastion of St.
Charles to the sea.

m—Bastion of St. Charles,

k—King's Bastion.

H—Bastion of Orleans.

g—Bastion of St. Domingo.

o—Fort Royal.

E₁—Bastion of Sta. Catalina.

n'—Bastion of the Rosario.

L—Traverse of the Rosario.

P¹—Bastion of St. Paul.

b¹ b—French breaching Batteries.

n n—Last French Parallel.

E—Breach through which the French entered at
the fifth assault.

d—Curtain of the front of St. John's Bastion.

y¹—Bastion of St. John.

o¹—Gate of St. John.

2-31-45

b—Curtain of the front of Jesus' Bastion.

y—Jesus Bastion.

a—Curtain of the Front of Cervantes Bastion.

c—Cervantes' Bastion.

Q—Cervantes' Traverse.

M' M' M'—Mediterranean Sea.

R' R'—High-street called the Rambla.

B—St. Clara's Gate.

F—Gate of Sto. Francisco.

7.7.7.7.—Intrenchments formed at the opening of the streets in the town.

r'r'r'—Streets.

8.8.8.8.—Houses, with battlements occupied by the Regiment of Almanza, who defended them, prevented the French from penetrating, and stopped them in the Rambla, until the troops that defended the top of the ramparts had retired. The Rambla street was strewn with the bodies of the French killed and wounded.

T.T.T.—Interior of the town.

N'—Harbour.

x—Part of the Mole.


1.4.3.2.—Line of Counter-attack proposed by Field Marshal Don Carlos Cabrer, Commander of the Engineers in the place, but rejected by the General-in-Chief.

6.6.6.6.—Batteries of the Enemy.

i.—King's Half-moon.

PREFACE.

I write from recollection: but events have struck my imagination so deeply, that although I may miscalculate distances, I am certain of not mis-stating facts. This conviction, and the necessity of exposing the conduct of the French at Tarragona, as well as that of Buonaparte, Suchet, and his Officers, towards me and the other Spanish prisoners, do not allow me to defer the publication of this little work.



DETAILS

RELATIVE TO THE

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF TARRAGONA,

&c. &c.

SITUATED on the shore and North of the sea, at a distance of six or seven hundred toises East of the mouth of the Francoli river, the town of Tarragona forms a rectangular parellelogram, of which the longest sides extend from East to West about five or six hundred toises, and the shortest three or four hundred.

The town was surrounded with a strong and high wall erected by the Romans: but the western part of this ancient rampart had been destroyed in the war of the Succession and replaced by another eight or ten feet thick and furnished with four bastions. The first of these, called Cervantes, was joined to the sea by a

traverse, which I caused to be constructed, and to which I also gave the appellation of Cervantes. The second was called Jesus. The third, was that of St. John, and had a gate communicating with the suburb. The fourth was the Bastion of St. Paul, whence issued a second traverse, called Rosario, because it terminated at the bastion so named, which belonged to the new enclosure, lately formed to cover the old one. Thus, through the means of these two traverses, the one to the right and the other to the left, I closed every passage to the enemy after he had taken possession of the suburb and of the external works by which it was defended.

Several points had been fortified outside the walls. These consisted, of Fort Loreto, situated on a rock at about four hundred toises North-East of the town, and five hundred from the sea, and supported by a small redoubt built close to it; of Fort Olivo at four hundred toises North of the town, and in the West of Fort Francoli, erected on the left bank and at the mouth of the river which bears that name.

Moreover, in order to cover the suburb, called by the French the lower town, and which lies between the place and the Francoli river, a line of fortifications had been traced, which extended from the Bastion of St. Paul to Fort Francoli, and was connected by different works, such as the Bastion of Rosario, those of Santa Catalina, St. Domingo, Orleans, the King, St. Charles, and a traverse going from the latter to the sea, on which a battery called St. Joseph was established. Thirty toises in advance of this traverse, was the Prince's half-moon, eighty toises distant from the fort of Francoli. In the interior of the suburb behind the Orleans Bastion, stood the Fort Royal, also constructed during the war of the Succession.

I shall not mention the other works of the place, as they were not attacked.

General Suchet, at the head of forty thousand infantry and six or eight thousand horse, with a hundred pieces of cannon and all the train necessary to carry on a siege, appeared before Tarragona, at the end of April 1811, and on the

night of the 4th of May completed its investment on the land side.

The same day (the 4th) Suchet caused the Aqueduct which supplied the town with water to be cut. But this operation had no fatal effect on the besieged, who never were in want of water during the whole continuance of the siege.

The French made their first attack on fort Olivo. Planted on a rock four hundred toises North of the place, it had sixty armed embrasures, and before the enemy could open the trenches against the body of the place, it was necessary they should carry this work.

May 5th. Four sorties were made from the place, which made the enemy fall back and killed many of his men.

6th. A corps of Miquelets coming from Manresa attacked Montblanc, a town situated on the road from Barcelona to Lerida, but could not dislodge the enemy who was there in force. Several sorties were also made from Tarragona against the French sharp-shooters.

8th. During the night the enemy traced a large redoubt on the sea side. In the day two English ships, two frigates and two gun-boats, greatly incommoded their labours and killed many of their workmen. They, however, succeeded in covering themselves before the evening.

10th. The Commander in Chief Campo Verde entered the place with the troops that came back from the environs of Figueras.

In the night of the 13th and 14th the enemy carried the two intrenchments built 150 toises in advance of fort Olivo. At the dawn of day the garrison of that fort made a sortie in three columns to retake those works, but unsuccessfully. At the same time the gun-boats kept a destructive fire on the enemy's labourers.

18th. The garrison of Tarragona made a sortie against several French battalions that had established themselves at about 100 or 120 toises from the fort of Francoli. They were driven from their post after an obstinate struggle and pursued to a great distance; but as soon as the garrison had re-entered the place, the French returned in force and re-occupied the same posi-

tions notwithstanding the loss they had experienced in killed and wounded.

20th. In the evening the garrison of Fort Olivo made a new sortie to destroy the works of the enemy. At the same time a corps of eight hundred men attacked the small redoubt on the left of fort Loreto, of which, a few days before, the enemy had taken possession. He lost many men, but could not be dislodged.

21st. Brigadier Sarsfield made a diversion on the side of Alcover, but could not maintain himself in the position which he had taken.

23d. A new attempt was made to carry Montblanc, which was momentarily occupied by the Miquelets, who were in their turn driven off by the French.

The enemy, however, pushed on his works of attack with activity, notwithstanding the fire of the place which killed a prodigious number of men. As early as the 22d he armed a new battery, which, directing its fire against the ships, compelled them to retire beyond the reach of cannon. He connected these batteries with the bridge of Francoli by a communication of 600

toises. On the 23d he began a parrallel on the rock before fort Olivo, fifty toises distant from the intrenchments which he had occupied, and as the rock was totally naked, he was compelled to bring mould from a great distance in order to fill up his gabions. He finished by establishing a breaching battery at sixty toises from the fort.

24th, 25th, 26th. The French crowned the steeps of the Francoli, for the attack on the right, and threw a bridge of Chevalets over that river, covering their communications with a flèche.

27th. They armed the breaching battery for the left attack, opposite fort Olivo, with four twenty-four pounders, and called it the battery of the King of Rome. They established, at the same time, three other batteries, notwithstanding the difficulties which the ground presented, the fire of the fort and a sortie made by the garrison. It was on this occasion that General Salm was killed. At the head of a column he opposed the sortie, and received a musket shot at the moment he endeavoured to lead his troops

against those of the garrison. On account of his death the French ceased to call that fort Olivo, and gave it the name of Salm, to honour the memory of that General.

28th. The batteries of the enemy began their fire. They dismounted several of our guns and destroyed the cavalier, the parapets and the batteries of the dead angle, which were the worst flanked of the whole work. Notwithstanding all these advantages, gained in so short a time, the enemy dared not yet venture to storm the place, so much did he fear the tried bravery of the garrison! But he continued to fire in various directions to dismount the guns that still remained on the left of the fort.

29th. At nine o'clock in the evening the assault took place under General Ficatier,* but with such a want of dexterity, that it would have occasioned the loss of all the assailants, had not

* General Ficatier, who, notwithstanding the bad dispositions made by the French engineers, had taken fort Olivo, was disgraced through the intrigues that prevailed at Suchet's head-quarters. He was sent back to France after the capture of Tarragona, and commanded the escort that led me from Reus to Lerida.

the engineers who had fortified that work, neglected to close an aqueduct, the mouth of which, discovered by the French, facilitated their entrance into the fort, and enabled them to attack its garrison in the rear. Though surprised to see the enemy behind them, whilst they defended the breach, which the shortness of his ladders did not allow him to reach, and though compelled to face on every side an antagonist whose force encreased every moment, the Spaniards remained undaunted. They fought like lions, and it was only at one o'clock in the morning that, overpowered with fatigue and by superior numbers, they abandoned fort Olivo to retire within the walls of the town.

This action was the more sanguinary as the garrison was double its usual force at the moment it took place. The troops of which it consisted were changed every eight days, and at the beginning of the assault the new garrison was arriving. These corps united amounted to upwards of four thousand men, and rivalled each other in bravery and obstinate resolution. The enemy had more than two thousand men

killed on the spot, although Suchet in his report acknowledges only a loss of 250 in the twenty-four hours, according to the habit which the French have of always glossing over their disadvantages and exaggerating their successes. Our loss was not very considerable. Suchet himself did not swell the number of the prisoners to more than eight or nine hundred; and the total of those who were found missing when the regiments re-entered the place, did not exceed 1000.

I had just arrived from Cadiz on board the *Prueba* frigate, and was immediately appointed to the command of the front and the *Rosario* gate, which stood opposite fort *Olivo*. I spent the night at this latter post, to protect the retreat of the regiments who returned from the fight without the enemy's daring to disturb their march, which he could have easily done on account of his superiority in cavalry, of the distance of the fort from the body of the place, the darkness of the night, and the impossibility in which our batteries found themselves of firing, lest we should destroy our own soldiers.

The next day (May 30th), the Commander-in-Chief, Marquis Campo Verde, assembled the generals, the chiefs of the artillery, and of the engineers, the delegates of the Superior Junta of Catalonia, &c. &c. After the advice of every one had been given, and mine had been heard on the manner of forcing the enemy to raise the siege (which I thought the only way of saving a town, which could not support a regular siege, on account of the unnumbered defects in its weak fortifications, most of the works not being yet finished, or having attained no consistency, without fosses or covered ways, and without gates to communicate with each other, or make strong sorties on the enemy to drive him from his works, and recover those of which he had obtained possession), in a word, after every opinion had been maturely considered, it was resolved, that I should take upon myself the defence of the place. I vainly objected that being newly arrived, I knew neither the officers nor the troops, the civil authorities nor the inhabitants, the place itself, of which there was even no plan, nor the resources of the country to which I was a total stranger:

that in fact I was ignorant of every particular which a commander ought to know to be able successfully to defend a place entrusted to his care. All was useless, and I received from the General-in-chief, in writing, the order of defending Tarragona.

The ensuing day (31st), the Commander-in-chief, the Staff of the army, and the principal inhabitants quitted the town. The General promised that at the end of six or eight days, at the utmost, he would bring the army to relieve the place, and, in conjunction with me, cause the siege to be raised. Flattering promise ! which satisfied every one but myself, who clearly foresaw that it would not be kept. However, not to discourage the public mind, and notwithstanding the little hope I had of being able to save Tarragona, I undertook its defence, determined, at least, to protract it as long as possible, in order to give time to Government to take and execute its measures, and resolved to sell dearly to the enemy every advantage he might obtain over me, and even by my fall, if it proved inevitable, to add new lustre to the glory of the Spanish name.

In fact, this place, though as weak as it has been represented, having lost fort Olivo, and being reduced to its walls, at the time it was entrusted to my care, made a defence that would have done honour to a fortress of the first order, attacked by an army as strong and as well supplied with every thing necessary to carry on a siege as was that of Suchet, when he appeared before Tarragona.

30th (May) at ten o'clock in the morning, on rising from the Council of War, General Campo Verde sent Colonel O'Ronan with 1500 men to retake fort Olivo, which it was thought had been evacuated by the enemy. This supposition was unfounded. Colonel O'Ronan was repulsed, and returned with the loss of twenty men.

31st. The General-in-Chief Campo Verde having left Tarragona, I regulated the service of the troops, established a military police, formed the inhabitants into companies, and even employed the women in making cartridges, lint, powder-bags, &c. In general, I had only to direct the zeal of the inhabitants. Neither age nor sex were urged by them as an excuse for

refusing to do what was required of them ; more than once I was compelled to check their ardour, and never found it necessary to excite their patriotism.

Besides the King's magazines, I formed others consisting of the useful objects abandoned by the various individuals who had quitted the place. The military caisse was reduced to 6000 Piastres ; I raised a contribution of 300,000 francs on the chief merchants of the town who had retired with their fortunes to Villa Nueva, without paying, on leaving Tarragona, any of the King's duties. This sum was thrown into the caisse of the Intendant de Piombo, to be employed under his inspection, and by my orders, for the service of the place.

In the night of the first and second of June, Suchet began his attack against the Orleans bastion, which the French called the "bastion des Chanoines." He established his first parallel at 100 toises from that work, extended it 400 toises in length, and rested its right on the Francoli river. This was the weakest side of the place, and so far his attack was well directed ;

but he made no false one, in which he was wrong, as he thus enabled me to turn the whole fire of my mortars and howitzers against him in that quarter, in which I equally incommoded him on the side of the sea by my gun-boats and the artillery of fort Francoli. This collected force caused him to lose many men, as they were frequently compelled to labour uncovered. After the second of June, the enemy employed himself in extending and perfecting his works, and preparing the establishment of his batteries, notwithstanding my sorties and my destructive fire.

7th (June). At the dawn of day fort Francoli was battered in breach, by 25 twenty-four pounders, placed in five batteries. The grape shot from this fort, and the shells from the place inflicted a severe loss on the enemy, but could not silence his fire. The curtain of this wretched work tumbled down on every side, the parapet of the batteries was razed and its garrison remained totally exposed to the fire of the enemy. At seven o'clock in the evening, I ordered Colonel Roten to evacuate it, after having withdrawn its artillery. It is therefore

Not true that this fort was taken by storm, as Suchet stated: but it is certain that he lost great numbers in its attack, for he did not spare his men. He beheld their destruction with indifference, and considered those unfortunate beings as the instruments of his fortune. He not only exacted from them the usual service as soldiers, but employed them as labourers, not having been able to procure any in the country. To compel them to work, he treated them with the greatest severity. He knew that his elevation or his disgrace depended on the issue of the siege.

After having taken possession of the fort of Francoli, the French established on its ramparts a battery of 6 twenty-four pounders to drive away the ships that lay on that side of the bay. They continued their labours, constructed a second parallel, which they finished on the 13th, and immediately established at fifty toises a battery against fort St. Charles.

In the night of the 11th, I sent out Brigadier Sarsfield with 3000 men, who engaged the enemy from twelve till two in the morning, repelled

his working parties and caused him a considerable loss. Of this sortie Suchet said nothing, any more than of another, made three nights before, by 300 grenadiers, who, in obedience to my orders, marched in the greatest silence until they rushed into his trenches, where they found both the sentries and guards asleep. I had ceased all firing from the place at sun-set, the enemy's labourers continued their work quietly, and those who were to protect them, being no longer alarmed, fell asleep, and suffered themselves to be surprised by my grenadiers who butchered or took them all. Amongst the killed was the commanding officer in the trench, who defended himself valiantly. His helmet and the knapsacks of his men were carried away by ours.

16th (June). At ten o'clock in the evening the enemy surprised 400 men who garrisoned the Prince's half moon, a work erected between fort Francoli and the town. After the capture of this post, the French constructed on its site, with sand bags, a new breaching battery, approaching more and more closely to the front attacked. They opened their third parallel,

pushed two *boyeaux* against the jutting angle of the covered way and that of the half-moon, crowned the top of the glacis and effected the descent of the fosse of the Orleans bastion.

On the 21st, the fire of the enemy began with the dawn of day. One of my shells blew up the powder magazine of one of his breaching batteries, which delayed a little his operations. Nevertheless at five in the evening, he had already made three practicable breaches, which proves what I have said before respecting the weakness of our fortifications.

Another occurrence also took place the same evening in favour of the French, of which I can here give no detail. Had it not happened, we should have much longer protracted the defence of the place and probably saved it. But the best concerted measures cannot change the decrees of Providence, and God had no doubt resolved that Tarragona should fall.

At last, at the commencement of the night of the 21st, the enemy stormed the bastion of St. Charles, that of Orleans and the Fort Royal, in five columns. After an obstinate resistance, our

troops abandoned these works and fell back towards the town. The enemy penetrated successively through the three breaches, mingled with our men, and in that desperate engagement, a most horrible massacre of French and Spaniards took place.

I was on the ramparts of the town, above St. John's gate, with a body of troops to assist those that fell back. But seeing them arrive pell mell with the French, I ordered the gate to be closed, for otherwise, friends and foes would have entered the town together. I then cried out to the Spanish troops, to range themselves in order of battle at the foot of the walls, which they did well, and quickly separated themselves from the French, upon whom I immediately opened a tremendous fire of musketry and grape shot which compelled them to retire, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded. A French captain, however, was audacious enough to advance to the very gate, with his company of grenadiers, and to endeavour to break it open with the butt ends of their muskets. But these unlucky men paid dearly for their

imprudence ; they were almost all killed. The Captain and his drummer fell the first, within two paces of the gate, and without the unfortunate occurrence, to which I have already hinted, the enemy would have been driven from the suburb and the other works that very night.

From twelve at night till three in the morning, the troops were employed in re-entering the town over the two traverses of the Rozario and Cervantes. The next day I caused an exact report to be made of the number of men missing in every regiment, and was astonished to find that our loss did not amount to more than 500 men. That of the enemy was far greater. Thus Suchet's exaggerations in his reports, and the cruelties of which he was guilty in allowing, without any necessity, the poor inhabitants to be massacred, had no other object than to conceal and avenge the heavy losses which he suffered from the beginning to the end of the siege.

In the night of the 21st, the enemy opened his first parrallel against the immediate body of the place, in advance of the Fort Royal, leaning his left on the bastion of St. Domingo and extending his right to the sea.

Once in possession of the suburbs, the enemy was also master of the mole, where he established a battery of two pieces of cannon to command the place of embarkation, which lies in the part of the bay called Milagro.

22d (June) From eleven o'clock in the morning till one in the afternoon, two frigates and three English ships, that lay in the bay, kept up a tremendous fire against the enemy's workmen and the plunderers, who searched the deserted houses in the suburb: so that through this cannonade and that of the place, which was incessant, the French lost a prodigious number of men during the construction of their works. Before the suburb had been taken, sorties were made from the advanced works, but since it was in the possession of the enemy, we came out through the Rozario gate which lay almost opposite fort Olivo, and the sharp-shooters, whom I sent out against the foe, descended on the right, over the traverse of Rozario, and on the left, over that of Cervantes. I was therefore compelled to refrain from making any more sorties, finding it equally impos-

sible to send the troops in proper order, when they passed over the traverses, as to make them go through the Rozario gate, which was too distant from the suburb.

The ensuing days, the enemy opened a second parallel at 60 toises, to prepare his attack, and establish his breaching batteries against the body of the place. He pushed on his works with activity, the fire continued uninterrupted on both sides, and the French shells fell incessantly within the town.

In the night of the 27th and 28th, the enemy having completed his works, armed his batteries, and at dawn of day, on the 28th, began to batter in breach the body of the place, at only 30 toises distance, with 14 twenty-four pounders, which in eight hours' time made a considerable breach, and the more easy to be approached, as the town had neither fosse nor covered way. The rock on which the walls are built had rendered the execution of these works impossible, and through the same reason, the French had been obliged to employ sand-bags to cover themselves more quickly, and to form the supports of their batteries.

"The fury of the French soldier" said Suchet in his Report of the 29th June, "was augmented by the resistance of the garrison, that daily expected its deliverance from the exterior, and was prepared to insure its own relief by a general sortie."

In fact, the garrison displayed, during the siege, the greatest constancy and bravery, and would have saved the place, if it had been assisted by the army. This was the reason that induced Suchet to hurry on his attacks and to sacrifice one half more men than he would have lost in a regularly conducted siege. On my part, I eagerly solicited that assistance, and seeing on the heights that surrounded Tarragona, the advanced posts of the Spanish army, I could not help confiding in the positive assurances which General Campo Verde gave me every day, that he would attack the rear of the enemy, and conceiving the hope of being able to preserve the place and save the province. (See the letters in which are contained those cruel and deceitful promises.) I resolved, therefore, to defend myself to the last extremity, and was thus led to the terrible day of the 28th June, the details of which I

gave to the Spanish Government in my report of the 30th June, which Suchet promised to forward to Cadiz, but which he sent to his master.

This report, as published by *Napoléon*, is not correct, for he altered and suppressed what he thought proper. To restore it to its original state, I add here, in italics, the passages which *Buonaparte* either changed or suppressed. It will be seen that I did not attribute the fall of Tarragona to the English, as he has endeavoured to make it believe I did; but that I confined myself to giving a plain account of what passed between the commander of the English division, Skerrett, and myself, when he came to see me on his arrival at ten o'clock on the evening of the 26th.

Far from attributing the fall of Tarragona to the English, it is with pleasure I publicly acknowledge the assistance I have received from three men of war and a frigate, commanded by Captain Codrington, of the *Blake*, 74, as well as his activity, the judicious measures he adopted to assist me in defending the place,

and the hearty frankness he has displayed in all his communications with me. He had the goodness to take upon himself the Police of the Bay, which contained a great number of merchant vessels, on board of which several families from Tarragona had sought a shelter. He caused our sick and wounded to be carried to the hospitals on the neighbouring coasts and islands; and the continual fire which his squadron directed against the works and labourers of the French, added greatly to the difficulties of their approach, and compelled them at last to open a new road through Balaguer, beyond the reach of the English guns, for the convoys that came from Tortosa. I may, therefore, declare, with truth, that if I had been assisted by land as I was by sea, by Commodore Codrington's squadron, Tarragona would certainly have never fallen.

MOST EXCELLENT LORD,

" The 28th instant, at dawn of day, the enemy opened his fire, and battered in breach the curtain of the front of fort St. John, at the

angle which it forms with the left flank of the bulwark of St. Paul. Our artillery and infantry behaved most heroically, and several times *succeeded* in checking the fire of the enemy, and thus delaying an operation which threatened us with an approaching assault. The situation of Tarragona became, at this moment, most critical. Through the want of boats, of time, and of a favourable opportunity, I found it impossible to save my garrison by sea. To attempt it by land would have been equally vain, as the enemy surrounded me with his whole army, and only expected my sortie to fall upon me.

“ To propose a capitulation would have been unworthy of the heroic defence the place had made, and *the garrison only wished to free itself from the French.*

“ Marquis Campo-Verde had promised to approach with the army to assist me: the English had arrived two days before with another division of troops to support me, but when they saw the danger which the town run, of being carried by storm, they determined not to

land. Thus, notwithstanding the promised assistance of our troops and the presence of our Allies, I found myself reduced to my garrison alone. In such a situation, well acquainted with the activity of the enemy, whose duty it was not to lose a single moment, but to give the assault before any attempt was made to carry into effect the ill-combined operation intended to force him to raise the siege, (an operation which had already lasted several days), I took the only part compatible with Spanish honour, my character, and my personal reputation. I resolved to die sword in hand, rather than to think of surrendering.

“ I foresaw beforehand the two unavoidable consequences which must spring from my resistance. Either the confusion, the defeat, the flight of the enemy, and the raising of the siege, if I proved successful ; or if beaten, and the French should force their way into the town, *I saw the general slaughter of the troops and the people, the plunder of private and public property, and every kind of violence committed.* But whilst foreseeing all

these evils, and resolving to meet and oppose the enemy on the breach, I also calculated whether my force was equal to such an enterprise, one of the most heroic that war displays, and to which but few men dare to have recourse.

“ I found, on inquiry, that I had still 8,000 of the best and most experienced veterans of Spain, who had immortalised themselves by the defence of Tarragona, and from whom this last effort was only wanting, to complete the great work of its deliverance. Having, therefore, determined to repel the assault of the enemy, I placed opposite the breach, two battalions of provincial grenadiers and the regiment of Almeria, with orders not to fire a single shot, but to rush upon the breach as soon as the French should reach it; attack their columns with the bayonet (for it was with this arm that dreadful operation was to have been executed) and drive them back, slaughtering them without mercy, in such heaps, that they would not dare to renew the storm.

“ I caused wine, brandy, and tobacco to be distributed among the soldiers; I addressed

them myself, inspired them with fresh ardour, and took every precaution which ought to be adopted at such a moment. The result disappointed my hopes. Our troops received the French with admirable resolution, and *repelled their first column*. But they did not exactly obey my instructions, which were to attack the advancing enemy in his movement, and the regiment of Almeria soon yielded up the ground it occupied, to support the grenadiers, and become their reinforcement and reserve.

“ In a word, 2,000 French grenadiers, supported by 5 or 6,000 men, without reckoning the main body of Suchet's army, which surrounded the place on every side, penetrated through the breach.

“ Our troops then began to retire from the wall in disorder, and, although I, and all my officers, did every thing in our power to stop them, and induce them to charge again, and to defend themselves in the streets, all our exertions were vain. Fancying they would find safety in flight, the soldiers ran to the sea-side, leapt down from the walls and over the palis-

sades, and endeavoured to escape, but were made prisoners by the French corps that invested us on the Barcelona side.

“ In proportion as our troops receded, the enemy occupied the ramparts of the old and new enclosures, and descended into the streets, where they killed, wounded, or, *at least, robbed* every one, without distinction of class, age, or sex. This tragedy would have been still more cruel, had not the French officers, full of generosity, saved all those they possibly could, and exposed themselves to fall victims to the fury of their own soldiers, who, *athirst for plunder, thought of nothing but robbing and slaying.*

“ At this moment, going myself to the ~~San-~~ Maxim gate, to rally, if possible, some soldiers, charge the enemy at their head, and save them during the night, or cut our way through the French, I was wounded in the stomach by a bayonet, and taken prisoner by one of the enemy's detachments. The rumour that I had been killed was immediately spread, and the general disorder increased to such a pitch, that soldiers were seen

casting their arms away, and, in their flight, throwing themselves disarmed into the hands of the French, who made them prisoners,

“ At last, after one of the most obstinate sieges, during which I had exhausted every means which the art of defending towns dictates, and which my limited number of men and materials enabled me to adopt, Tarragona fell amidst the horrors occasioned by the heroism of a garrison, that shuts its ear to every proposal of capitulation. The evening of the 28th of June, 1811, will become memorable with posterity, by the tragical downfall of this ancient capital of Citerior Spain, which beheld, during the siege, the destruction of its temples and edifices by six or seven thousand shells and grenades, and an immense number of cannon balls, that filled with terror the islands of Majorca and Minorca, and the shores of the Mediterranean, the hospitals of which have been stocked with her wounded defenders—which witnessed, at the last moment of its existence, the sacrifice of so many victims, *slaughtered because they would not bear the yoke*

of the enemy, who did not take a strong place, or a magnificent city, but a heap of ruins, which entomb unnumbered martyrs to the purest patriotism, immolated on the altar of Spanish freedom, and whose death ought to purchase for their names an inscription on marble and brass, to teach our posterity, in future ages, how to fight for their country.

“ The next day, General Count Suchet had me brought on a litter to his head-quarters at Constanti, where I found Generals Courten and Cabrer, Brigadier Mesina, and other staff officers, who had been made prisoners, with upwards of 7,800 men, 400 of which were officers, who were all marched into France. The General sent for me to his residence, and in presence of the chief officers of his army and *my own*, told me aloud, that I was the cause of all the horrors which his troops had committed in Tarragona, because I had prolonged my defence beyond the limits prescribed by the laws of war, which commanded him to inflict death upon me, for not having asked to capitulate as soon as the breach was opened. That taking

the town by storm, he had a right to put every one to the sword, and burn every thing*; and that aware of this, the besieged should hoist a white flag, to capitulate as soon as the breach was effected.

“ I replied, that if it were true that the laws

* Carnot in his work on the defence of fortified places, planned by Buonaparte himself, and written by his command, and which has already gone through a third edition, says, page 7th, chapter the first :—“ The guilty, if it happened that a place were carried by storm after a brave and well-conducted defence, would not be the man who should have maintained it at the peril of his life, but he who should abuse his triumph. The former has heroically fulfilled his duty, the second would dishonour his victory. Let it not be said that plunder is one of the rights of war. That right never existed except amongst barbarians. The most eminent Generals, at all times, have endeavoured to repress it, and have often succeeded. Such was the conduct of Marshal Saxe, at the capture of Prague, which he took by escalade. He gave such strict orders, that the soldiers committed no excesses whatever in the town.”

Such are the sentiments Buonaparte expresses, and causes to be expressed, in order to dazzle, whilst he pursues a totally opposite line of conduct, in order to terrify.

of war allowed besiegers, who forced their way into a place, to sack and burn it, and put its inhabitants to the sword, and if they pointed out the moment when the storm is on the eve of taking place, as that when a capitulation should be proposed ; they did not, however, forbid the garrison to defend itself, and endeavour to repel the assault. I stated that I had resisted, because I had sufficient forces to beat back his, which I certainly should have done, had the dispositions which I had made been exactly followed. That besides, I expected to have been relieved the ensuing day, both by Campo-Verde and from the side of the sea ; and that having resisted until the breach had been opened, I should have passed for a coward if I had not dared to defend it. I concluded by maintaining, that no law forbade my endeavouring to repel an assant.

“ General Suchet convinced, by the powerful reasons which I gave, *with the dignity due to my character as Commander-in-Chief of so brave a garrison, acknowledged that if I had succeeded in beating him back, the Cata-*

lotian war would have assumed a totally new face: that, aware in how short a time I expected to have been relieved, he had hastened his operations to anticipate the intended diversion as much as it was possible, because he feared he should not succeed in his enterprise if he waited any longer; and at last treated me, as well as the other generals and officers, with all the distinction which our resistance had deserved—a resistance, which the French own has been the greatest they had yet encountered; since, though other places may have protracted still longer the duration of the siege, it was because they had not been attacked in so regular a manner, with so formidable a battering train, and so much obstinacy: for the great and incessant loss of men on both sides, discouraged neither the besiegers nor the besieged. On this account, the siege of Tarragona proved more murderous than any other; for more than 18,000 men, French and Spaniards, perished. No one can doubt of this, who has witnessed the constant and tremendous

fire, from all kinds of arms, reciprocally kept up day and night, and seen the killed, wounded, and prisoners in our sorties. It is not astonishing, therefore, that the French should have lost 19 officers of engineers, 31 of artillery, 14 colonels, commanders of regiments; General Salm, and more than 12,000 men. On our part, we lost in all, 32 artillery officers, and 6,000 men killed.

“ The garrison displayed the greatest heroism in its defence, until the moment of the assault. It then betrayed weakness. The soldiers grew intimidated and gave way. The officers, on the contrary, behaved with undaunted gallantry throughout; and, sword in hand, made the most strenuous efforts to contain the troops, and rally them, that they might resist, and turn against the French, who pursued and killed them in the streets. But their panic increased every moment, and they suffered themselves to be cut down by us, rather than dare to face the enemy and renew the action. .

“ Every thing seems to have conspired against this unfortunate garrison. Campo-

Verde promised, on quitting it, that he would immediately return to relieve it. This he has never done, though he daily renewed his promises, as may be seen by several letters which I have preserved, and which will be found in the Appendix. The kingdom of Valencia sent General Miranda with a division of Valencian troops to assist the town. They landed at Tarragona, and the next day re-embarked and joined Campo-Verde's army. An English division presented itself on the 26th inst. Its commander, Colonel Skerrett, landed the same evening to consult with me, and asked me what I wished him to do with his men. I replied, that if he would land them, and enter the place, he should be received with joy, and treated as he deserved: that he had only to select the post which he would defend, and that I should appoint him to it. But that I left it entirely to his choice, as I would neither command nor advise him. The next day the chiefs of the engineers and artillery, belonging to this English division, came to examine the state of the walls against which the enemy's attack was

directed, and thinking that the place was incapable of further resistance, returned on board their ships. So that they all withdrew from Tarragona, and yet they were come to assist it ! This abandonment, on the part of those that had been sent for the express purpose of relieving us, was the severest blow we had yet received. It produced the most fatal impression on the *moral* of our troops, who began to foresee they were lost. Their spirits drooped; and they only resisted in compliance with my ceaseless exhortations, and because they found me cool and confident that if they executed my orders, the French would not be able to penetrate within our walls. Such representations, however, could only avail for a few short hours; and the conviction that they were abandoned, resumed its hold on their minds, and completely mastered them.

“ Had not Marquis Campo-Verde promised to relieve us, without fulfilling that engagement: had not General Miranda shown himself in the town with his division, only that it might appear and disappear with the rapidity

of lightning: had not the English division placed itself before our eyes; in a word, had not the garrison been solemnly assured, every day during the siege, and every moment, even at the last extremity, that it should be relieved, conscious that it had to rely on its own strength alone, it would have effected still greater things. But these hopes and expectations, so pleasing, so promising in appearance, but fatal in reality, since they rested on no foundation, good or bad, were the causes that disarmed the garrison of all the valour and heroism it had displayed until the moment of the assault. At that time, had the resistance of our troops been protracted only *a quarter of an hour longer, the enemy would have been checked, and would have retired, and no panic would have so far unmanned our soldiers as to render all my efforts, and those of my officers, unavailing to stop them, and bring them back to the charge. But the officers who fought to the last, and distinguished themselves on that fatal evening, deserve the whole esteem of the nation and the government, and ought*

to wear, as a mark of distinction, a red cross; each ray of an equal length, hanging from a royal crown of gold, with a palm, which forms the arms of Tarragona, and on the reverse this inscription, “ *Rather die than surrender.*” But this cross should only be worn by those whom I mention in the inclosed list, for a great number of officers fled from Tarragona to avoid trouble and danger. Some, without leave; others requesting it under pretences little honourable to themselves; some feigning illness, and others committing every kind of baseness to cover their pusillanimity. Such, not only do not merit any distinction, but they ought to be deprived of their commissions; otherwise they would have the impudence to assume those decorations, and to pretend that they have served in the siege.

“ Most of our corps have been commanded by captains, instead of the chiefs who had left us. These captains should be made commanders, and those of the latter class, who withdrew themselves, and sought for safety and amusement at Villa Nueva, or elsewhere,

should be cashiered; otherwise justice would not be done, and justice must be done.

The inclosed list also shows the worthy officers who have deserved to be particularly recommended to his Highness. Besides the distinguishing reward, his Highness will bestow upon them whatever his munificence may think proper.

“ As to what concerns myself, I have never asked any thing, and will now only request that I may be exchanged as soon as possible. I wish it ardently, that I may again take the field. Meanwhile, I hope that my wife, who is at Majorca, will receive a part of my appointments. I should not ask this favour either, were not my estates in the hands of the enemy.

“ Before the fall of Tarragona, I wrote and expressed my decided opinion, that in consequence of the pending, or rather, the meditated operations, the place, the garrison, and the army, must infallibly be lost. The Supreme Junta of the Principality will be able to give you any information you may wish for,

on every point, as I have always carefully communicated to its members every thing that happened. On their side, they have done all in their power to promote the undertaking of the operation, which was to compel the enemy to raise the siege, (operation which alone ought to have employed the army, and to have been executed without delay, in concert with me, whatever might be the number and the nature of the enemies we had to engage) but all was in vain. Every day it grew less and less thought of at head-quarters, as may be seen by General Campo-Verde's letter, in which he commanded me to send him 3,000 of the best troops of the garrison, who were to embark during the night of the 27th and 28th, under Colonel O'Ronan, who had presented himself at my house at 11 o'clock at night. I gave orders for their embarkation, with the regiment of Almeida, but this operation did not take place, and nothing more was seen of Col. O'Ronan.

“ The same letter will also serve to illustrate the confusion that prevailed at head-quarters, where Marquis Campo-Verde fancied

that an English division, 4,000 strong, had entered the town, whilst the British commander assured me that he had not more than 1,000 men, who had left Cadiz the 9th June. The Marquis also desired that the troops which he had asked, should embark the same night, whilst he must have known that it was impossible, for I had no other means of embarkation than those which the English could supply, and at that period they had none at their disposal.

“ From the enclosed letters, your Excellency will perceive that nothing remained for me to do; and his Highness may be certain, that in no other occasion whatever can the glory of the Spanish arms attain higher elevation, than it has done in the defence of Tarragona. On this point I only refer to what the enemy himself will state; who, being accustomed to diminish our merit, cannot be suspected of flattery on this occasion.

“ The French commander, who knows how
 “ important it is to every man in place, and
 “ especially to one, who, like myself, has been

" entrusted with so great an enterprise as the
 " defence of Tarragona, to make facts known,
 " such as they are in reality, before the public
 " opinion can be formed on vague and ex-
 " aggerated reports, has granted me the re-
 " quest which I made him, of allowing an
 " officer to pass to lay before your Excel-
 " lency the report of all that has happened.

" I hope your Excellency will have the
 " goodness to order the literal impression of
 " this *exposé*, which is due to the public
 " cause, the national honour, that of Tarra-
 " gona, and of the Principality of Catalonia,
 " to the glory of the officers, that of the gar-
 " rison, and to mine in particular, which
 " might suffer from my silence, if I did not
 " give an account of my person and my
 " operations.

" God preserve your Excellency many years.

" Most Excellent Lord,

" JEAN SENEN DE CONTRERAS.

" The Most Excellent Lord the

" Minister at War "

During my abode at the head-quarters at Constanti, and afterwards at Reus, General Suchet treated me with every mark of regard and distinction ; but I was always watched by several officers, and two centries were placed at the door of my room. I was sent for, almost every day, to dine either with Suchet or with some other general, and they seemed to vie together who should honour me most. There is no kind of dignity, of command, or of wealth, that they did not offer to me, if I would pass from the service of Spain and Ferdinand VII. to that of Buonaparte. They employed, to seduce me, the most studied speeches, and endeavoured to convince me that it was impossible for Spain ever to recover her independence, although assisted by the whole power of England, describing the latter as the cause of all the calamities of the present war. They added that Spain, speedily left to herself, would be compelled to submit through want of resources, of forces, and, above all, of a head to direct them, since hitherto not a man had been found, on whom the general opinion

centered, and without whom, it was impracticable to defend, with any appearance of success, a nation placed in so critical a situation as the Spanish people. They added, that nothing but the most complete blindness, and the total absence of reason, could make us conceive the hope of closing successfully a war, which, they acknowledged, was unjust on their part*, but absurd on that of the Spanish Government, contrary to the interests of the nation, and to those of every private individual.

I replied to these gentlemen, that our opinions differed widely: that I was convinced the French would never be masters of Spain: that the war might be long, but that at last they would be driven from our land, even should England withdraw her aid, which was not to be believed: that we had men, able to organize our armies, inure them to war, and

* Those are Suchet's own words, the night of the 29th of June, at Constanti, in presence of his officers, of the Spanish Generals, Courten, Cabrer and Messina, and of the servants who waited at table.

to wield with energy the immense resources of the nation, and that from the moment one of these men should be authorised to display his talents; the French might date the beginning of their ruin. I also urged, that they might be convinced of the truth of what I advanced, from what the Spanish nation had already done; when, taken by surprise, and attacked at the time the French were in possession of the strong places, of the army and the government, universal indignation had raised, armed, and united every Spaniard:—and when an irregular mass of peasants, hastily collected, had compelled the French armies, till then the terror of Europe, to lay down their arms; had beaten them at Bailen, driven them from Valencia and Madrid, forced them to raise the siege of Saragossa, to cross the Ebro, and to seek shelter among the mountains of Biscay, I contended, that if the national enthusiasm had then been properly directed, there would not have been a second campaign; and that, notwithstanding the faults committed by the inexperience of the new authorities, which had

succeeded each other in the Supreme Government, the hatred of the Spaniards against the French had been increased by the injustice of their aggression, and the atrocity of their conduct towards the people and their prisoners: that nothing would be so easy as to organise all the youths able to carry arms, and that because it had not yet been done, it was not to be believed it could not be afterwards effected; and at last, that notwithstanding what might be said, we knew very well that the French could only maintain themselves on our side of the Pyrenees, through the most enormous sacrifices, in money and men; for, that since the commencement of the invasion to the capture of Tarragona, no less than 700,000 infantry, and 70,000 cavalry, had entered Spain, out of which half a million had been killed: that it was a gross error, a despicable tale, a shameful ignorance of the Spanish character, to endeavour to persuade the world that our brave nation had risen and taken up arms at the instigation of the English, of Monks and Churchmen! That when indignant Spain uprose, it

was spontaneously, to avenge the injuries heaped on the people and the royal family, to avoid the degradation of receiving a king from the hand of an enemy, instead of her legitimate sovereign, and to shake off a foreign yoke. Those innate ideas were deeper rooted in the heart of every Spaniard, I maintained, than the institution of monks, or affection for the English.

As to the proposal, that I should quit the service of my country, to enlist under hostile banners, I remarked that I must be as void of sense, as of honour, if I listened to it, when I saw the contempt with which the French themselves treated those Spaniards who had been so base as to accept their offers, and to betray their duty. And, in reality, I never saw any of those deserters seated at Suchet's table ; and when they were admitted to his drawing-room, no one ever spoke to them. This remark was also made by the other Spanish officers taken at Tarragona.

To the flattering description of Buonaparte, given me by Suchet at Saragossa, I opposed an

eulogium of Ferdinand VII. and the goodness of his cause. I at last concluded by proposing to Suchet himself, to quit Napoleon's service, and to enter that of Ferdinand. This proposal put an end to those which he had so repeatedly made me, and from that moment he saw me no more.

All these conversations reached the public ear, especially while we staid at Saragossa, and increased the affection which the inhabitants of all classes displayed towards me. They saw, with pleasure, that after having defended the just cause, sword in hand, I did not shrink from supporting it, even in captivity, and in the midst of our enemies, without caring what sufferings my patriotism might draw down upon me.

From the 29th of June to the 9th of September, I constantly followed the head-quarters, from Constanti to Reus, from Reus to Lerida, and from Lerida to Saragossa. In the places where there was no castle, I was lodged and boarded in private houses with their inhabitants, and at the expence of the municipality,

but always attended by my guards. At Lerida I was confined in the castle, and began to receive my rations, which grew less and less, in proportion as Suchet's hopes of gaining me over to his party diminished.

September 9th, General Suchet set off from Saragossa for Valencia. On the 11th, at half past one o'clock, I was ordered to prepare to go to France. At the same time, the French took the precaution of closing the gates and turn-pikes of Saragossa, lest the inhabitants should attempt to rescue me from the hands of my guards, or at least should give notice to the country people. At four o'clock I sat out, accompanied by several Spanish officers and soldiers, also prisoners, and escorted by the 11th battalion of artillery, and 30 cavalry, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Le Long, who led us as far as Pau. That officer, and all those who had previously escorted us, answered for me on their life. Besides, the orders given to every commander of a convoy of prisoners, are, to shoot, not only those who separate from the troop, but those whom fatigue or illness

force to linger in the rear. In general these orders are executed, but more or less strictly, according to the humanity or cruelty of the soldiers and their commanders. I must do Colonel Le Long the justice to state, that he saved the life of one of those unfortunate men who was sick. He left him in a village near Huesca, and only took a receipt from the Alcade of that place, notwithstanding the importunities of one of the officers of the convoy, who wished the forementioned order to be executed in all its rigour.

Colonel Le Long took me as far as Pau, where he resigned me to the *gendarmerie*. I then claimed the pay due to prisoners of war of my rank, according to Napoleon's regulations. The War Commissary rejecting my claim, I appealed to the General commanding the military division, and resident at Bayonne. In consequence of an official note on the subject, transmitted to him by the commander of the town of Pau, he directed that I should be paid according to Napoleon's ordinance, beginning from the day I was taken

prisoner. He ordered, besides, that any sum I might require, be advanced to me, in order that I might travel both comfortably and decently ; I nevertheless limited my demand to the 500 francs that were due to me. With this sum, and some ounces of gold which a patriot had found means to transmit to me, during my residence in the castle of Saragossa, and which I shared with General Courten, I removed from Pau to the castle of Bouillon, escorted by a *gendarme*, who travelled at my expence.

Our road ran through Tarbes, Auch, Montauban, Limosges, Moulins, Nevers, Montargis, Fontainebleau, Melun, Meaux, Soissons, Rheims, Mezieres, Charleville, and Sedan to Bouillon.

At Limosges we learnt that King Ferdinand VII. was at the castle of Valencey, near Chateauroux, and that it had been ordered, that every Spaniard who should be found in the department of the Indre, which contains the castle inhabited by his Catholic Majesty, be immediately shot. On this account, the *gen-*

darme who escorted me, quitted the Orleans road, and took that to Moulins and Nevers. He was also commanded not to pass with me through the 18th military division, but I never could learn for what reason.

October 22d, 1811, I reached Bouillon. The next day I was presented to the governor of the castle, Captain Petit, who led me to the apartment prepared for my reception, in consequence of an order of the 1st of August, by which Napoleon commanded him to treat me with all the attentions due to my rank, and not incompatible with the security of my person. He was directed to keep this order secret, and not to mention my coming until I had arrived. But the repairs necessarily made in the apartment destined for me, announced that a new prisoner was expected; and the very precautions taken to conceal the order given on that subject, created a belief, that a person of great importance was on his way to the castle. Some thought it was the Pope, or some Cardinal, whilst others fixed on Generals Dupont, or Marescot, whose fate was not then decided,

but who have been since condemned to imprisonment for life*.

The castle of Bouillon, built about the year 950, by Godfrey the Ancient, grandfather to the celebrated Godfrey de Bouillon, the conqueror, and the first king of Jerusalem, is situated on a mountain 200 feet above the level of the small river called La Smoie. At the foot of the castle stands the town, which, together

* At their return to France, in 1808, Generals Dupont and Marescot were imprisoned, the one for having concluded, and the other signed, the capitulation of Bailen. Buonaparte wished to have them tried by the High Imperial Court, but his Privy Council hinted to him that they would be acquitted. As it was his intention to get rid of them, he dissimulated. The High Imperial Court was not assembled, although it had been announced in the papers, and the two generals remained in prison, without any thing being decided on their fate, until the end of 1811, or the beginning of 1812, at which time a Privy Council was holden, with closed doors, by whom they were sentenced to imprisonment for life. The newspapers have never mentioned this decision of the Secret Tribunal, nor even named the Generals themselves, since their return to France.

with its suburbs, contains about three thousand people. It is surrounded with a weak rampart, the base of which is bathed externally by the waters of the Smoie.

When I entered this castle, it contained three French gentlemen, Messrs. Bouvet de Lozier, Armand Gaillard, and Augustin Rewbell; seven Flemish priests, a French vicar, and a Benedictine monk from Mayence. Mr. Rewbell, formerly commander of a squadron, and aide-de-camp to General St. Suzame, had been arrested in 1803, and sentenced to two years imprisonment, *yet he was still confined in 1812*. Messrs. Bouvet and Gaillard had been condemned to death in 1804, as implicated in the plot of General Georges: but their sentence had been softened by Napoleon himself, into four years imprisonment, and yet they had been nearly eight years confined in the castle of Bouillon, without any hope of ever quitting it, when I became their fellow-captive the 23d of October, 1812.

Scarcely was I settled in my apartment, when the governor informed me that I was

not allowed to go out of the castle; that all my letters must pass through his hands, those which I should write, in order that they might be sent to the Minister of Police, and those which I should receive, to be given me by himself, and that my pay, like that of the other state-prisoners entrusted to his care, would be 25 sous a day (twelvepence-halfpenny, English, and forty quartos of Spanish money). To complete the "attentions" paid to my rank, a fortnight after, Savary, the Minister of Police, ordered the governor to take away my servant, on the ground, that every Spaniard found in France being considered as a prisoner of war, my servant must be sent to the nearest dépôt. He, however, *graciously* allowed me, if I wanted a servant, to keep one, provided it be a Frenchman. I rejected this absurd offer, and was deprived of the chief consolation which I still retained, that of being able to converse with one of my own countrymen, a young man, who had followed me through my misfortunes, out of pure attachment, whose disinterestedness and fidelity were seldom equalled,

and who consented to be imprisoned with me, rather than forsake his master. This servant, whose name was Raphael de Lariva, was sent to Charleville, where there is a depôt of 300 prisoners of the regiment of Asturias, commanded by the French serjeant Santana. These brave Spaniards refused to serve under the banners of the pretended King Joseph. They have a treatment of three sous (three-halfpence), and a pound and an half of bread a day. But they are allowed to work, and what they gain procures them the means of subsisting. This is not the case, however, with all our unfortunate countrymen; some of them are employed in the public works, but others are reduced to the greatest misery. There are places where they cannot all find work, and where those who labour, do not get enough to support their companions. There, *they literally die of hunger*. We have thus lost many men, and a far greater number would have perished, had it not been for the humanity of compassionate people, who have dared to come to their relief. In acting thus, Buonaparte

has two ends in view. He saves expence, and he hopes, through excess of misery, to force our soldiers to go over to his party. In the month of December, and in the heart of winter, I have met two hundred prisoners, lean, pale, starved with cold, and looking more like spectres than living beings. Most of them went barefooted, without hats, and covered with a miserable linen bag. Not one of them had a single rag of cloth on their bodies! Such is the fate of those that keep their health. When ill, and sent to the hospital, they fare still worse. Out of a *hundred* not *two* come out alive! I do not exaggerate, I state the truth. Such is the manner in which privates are treated; what is the fare of the officers? The rate of pay is very low, and insufficient for those of inferior rank: but as Buonaparte does not acknowledge the promotions that have taken place since the war, officers are rated on the pay-list only according to the commissions which they hold from the king. Thus a General is frequently only paid as a Colonel, or Lieutenant-Colonel; a Captain as a Lieute-

nant ; and lower officers as serjeants, More-
 over, it is forbidden to any Spaniard to wear
 the decorations of our military orders, and the
 gendarmes are ordered to *tear* them from those
 who should disobey that mandate. And, after
 this, should we allow the French prisoners
 among us to wear those crosses of honour,
 those ribbands of all colours, and newly fabri-
 cated orders? Should we acknowledge the
 commissions and ranks given by the Gallie
 Usurper? Should we not send his soldiers to
 our mines, as he employs ours to dig his canals
 and form his roads? I trust the time is come
 when we shall fight with equal weapons.—(See
 Appendix, No. II.) But let us return once more,
 for a moment, to what concerns me personally,

Surprised at being treated in a manner ap-
 parently so contrary to the orders issued re-
 specting me, I wrote to the Ministers, and to
 Buonaparte himself, to depict my situation, and
 claim the protection of the rights of men and
 the customs adopted by all civilized nations. It
 was in vain ; my applications were disregarded,
 and I thank heaven they were, I should have

been bound by my parole, I was freed from all ties of honour by his unjust proceedings. Growing daily more and more incensed at them, and always inspired with the wish of serving my country in the just war which she wages, I formed the plan of escaping. I wanted a companion who should assist me in carrying it into execution; I looked round for one, and having ascertained that Mr. Bouvet was a man of abilities, resolute and secret, I entrusted him with my intention. I was right, as experience has since proved; we soon agreed together, and happily had no occasion to communicate our plan to any other person, in consequence of which I grew confident of success.

We examined from our rooms, the safest and most commodious way of scaling the walls of our dungeon. Some attempts showed us the most convenient method, which we carried into effect the night of the 1st and 2d of October, 1812, notwithstanding grates and bolts, the vigilance of sentries, and what was still more grateful to our feelings, notwithstand-

ing the minute precautions of Governor Petit, who, a short time before, had been directed by the Police Minister Savary, to encrease his watchfulness about me.

The absence of the moon, a dark and rainy night, favoured our purpose. I insisted on descending first : it was necessary to pass over a perpendicular height, and then to slide forty or fifty feet down a rock, an inclined plane, before we could reach an horizontal projection, which rises midway up the sides of the mountain. On this projection is a path that leads to steps cut out of the rock, and descending in the direction of the wall, which extends from the castle to the gate of the town. This descent terminates at the beginning of the street, from which it is separated only by a small gate, which did not long resist our efforts. At last, after an hour and an half of fatigue and exertions, we found ourselves out of the town without meeting with any accident, save a contusion on my right shoulder, which I received when sliding down the rock. We fell in with no one, and escaped the patrols of the National Guards, then busy in watching and seeking

marauders, whose frequent depredations were occasioned by the scarcity which, at that time, prevailed in France, and was still more severely felt in the poor department of the Ardennes than in any other part of the country.

From that period (October 1, 1812) my companion and I traversed many provinces of France, sometimes on foot, at others on horse-back, now in a carriage, and now in a boat, and reached several points of the coast, in the hope of finding an opportunity of crossing over to England; hope which we were only able to realize in the month of June of the present year.

It is not easy to conceive the reason that induced Buonaparte to confine me and to treat me as a state-prisoner, instead of sending me to a depôt of prisoners of war, as are most of the Spanish and English Generals. But Napoleon's conduct is directly the reverse of that which the French once displayed towards captive enemies. Formerly they honoured courage even in a foe. Bravery and a long resistance were titles to their esteem and

claims on their generosity. Buonaparte's system, founded on injustice and perfidiousness, is naturally hostile to whatever is loyal and generous. Conscious that he can claim no esteem, he wishes to inspire fear. He persecutes, and would exterminate whatever resists him. Palafox, who so courageously defended Saragossa; Martines, who behaved so resolutely at Figueras; Caro, who distinguished himself at the battle of Saguntum, were confined, like myself, in fortified castles. What is still more horrible, if we are to credit the public rumour, the brave Governor of Gerona was poisoned in the fort of Figueras, to which he had been led as a prisoner of war. But such atrocious conduct, if publicly avowed, would disgust even his slaves, the French. He therefore carefully conceals it under the veil of nobleness of mind and generosity. Regulations are made for the treatment of prisoners of war, and orders are produced to insure their comfort, but these are to satisfy and deceive the public. To gratify his hatred and his vengeance, secret directions are given,

and those alone, as I have experienced it, are obeyed. This may be known from what I have stated, respecting the manner in which I and so many others have been treated.

But those regulations and deceitful orders, which he carefully publishes, are alone read and known. Foreign powers believe they are executed, and treat the French Generals, officers and soldiers, whom they make prisoners, as they fancy their own are treated. His apparent moderation imposes upon them, whilst his hatred is gratified, and a double end is thus attained. His want of faith in his treaties with other Powers, is equal to that which he displays in his transactions with individuals. No capitulation, no convention stops him. His will is his law, and his conduct towards Spain has sufficiently proved it. And yet Governments will treat with him, and trust that he will fulfil the engagements which he contracts! Hence springs his strength. His enemies think themselves bound, he alone knows no tie. They wage war with him according to regulations and customs in use among civilized

nations, whilst his code is that of savages. To the present civilization of Europe, he opposes the barbarity of the most remote ages. Of this, the horrors committed at Tarragona form a striking instance, and must load him and his agent Suchet with the everlasting execration of mankind. For the sack of Tarragona was not an event produced only by the intoxication and fury of the troops. It had been foreseen and ordered by Suchet, who, in his report of June 26, says positively :—" I much fear that if the garrison of the place awaits the storm in the last inclosure, I shall be compelled to make a terrible example, and to terrify Catalonia and all Spain for ever, by the destruction of a whole city." He adds a little lower, " The ardour and the good will which animate the whole army hourly increase. They aspire to strike a last blow that will terminate this long struggle with splendour." In his report of June 29, this monster, the worthy slave of such a master, relating the capture of the place, says :—" The fury of the soldiers was augmented by the resistance of the garrison. The

fifth assault, given yesterday at mid-day with still more vigour than the preceding, has occasioned a most horrible massacre, and but little loss on our side. The terrible example which I foresaw, in my last report to your Excellency, has taken place, and will long resound throughout Spain."

In consequence of his threats, it might have been expected that Suchet, like a brave warrior, penetrating by storm into Tarragona, the long defence of which had inflamed the fury of his soldiers, would have put to the sword the garrison that had made such a defence, and especially me, by whom it was commanded, and who had refused to capitulate, or to admit any of his flags of truce, that I might not even hear a summons. Yet the French did not even attempt it! They wounded me, it is true, surrounded and plundered me, disputing with each other the glory of having made me prisoner; but after all, those soldiers, so irritated, according to Suchet, did not kill me, my officers, nor my garrison, but turned all their rage against the defenceless inhabitants, who little

expected such cowardly cruelty from a people, who have incessantly on their lips the words, honour, humanity, philanthropy, benevolence, civilization, &c. But these words have, with them, no meaning, and are only employed to deceive strangers. The interest of the moment, whatever it be, is their sole guide. Thus, as it would have been dangerous to have attempted to put to the sword eight thousand men, who still had arms in their hands, and who, finding themselves massacred, might have at last recovered from the panic by which they had been unfortunately seized, and have succeeded in driving the French from the town, actuated no doubt by that fear, the enemy hastened to spare the soldiers and to remove them, which was necessary, that they might sack the town as they pleased. In fact, it was only then that the plunder and massacre commenced.

To take advantage of this "*terrible example, and terrify Catalonia and all Spain for ever,*" Suchet was guilty, the next day, of a new act of cruelty, which Robespierre himself could not have imagined. He caused about

one hundred Alcades and Corregidors to be collected from the environs, and led by an escort through the streets and squares of Tarragona, that they might see the corpses with which they were filled, having previously had all those that were in the interior of houses thrown out, and ordered that none should be taken away. His intention was, that on their return within their respective jurisdictions, those Alcades and Corregidors should publish what they had seen, in order that the inhabitants, terrified by this horrible relation, should never dare to oppose a similar resistance, which would subject them to similar calamities. This is what Suchet told me. I assured him that he deceived himself, and that such a measure, instead of answering his expectations, would produce quite a contrary effect. Far from being subjugated by fear, the Catalonians, I maintained, would be exasperated by the cruelties committed at Tarragona. Every one of them would become a tyger athirst for blood and vengeance, which they would consider as a sacred obligation, and

every Frenchman who should fall into their hands would be murdered without mercy. My prediction was verified : for in the month of August, Suchet complained bitterly in my presence, at Saragossa, of the cruelties exercised by the Catalonians on all the French who fell into their power. These details prove on what a system of barbarity and seduction Buonaparte and his Generals lay the foundation of their successes.

During the eight months that I was wandering through the various provinces of France, whilst endeavouring to procure the means of crossing over to England, I observed, with an unprejudiced eye, the state of the public mind, and the resources of the countries which I explored. I ardently longed to reach London in January, February, or March, a period when Buonaparte had no means of resistance, had he been attacked in the heart of France, or on the Rhine. I apprehended, and with but too much reason, that the Allied Powers, through ignorance of the real situation of France, would suffer the opportunity of strik-

ing a decisive blow, to be lost. The delays which I encountered, enabled me to witness the extraordinary measures taken by Buonaparte to form and organize a new army, which, though wanting in experience, should at least, through its superior numbers, be able to make head against the Russian and Prussian forces.

All his proposals, the most vexatious and the most burthensome to the people, pass without any opposition from the Senate or the Legislative Body, which do not form the shadow of a counter-balancing weight to his really despotic power. He lately spake, for he did not even condescend to ask, and 1200,000,000 of francs, seven hundred thousand troops of the line and national guards, and eighty thousand cavalry were placed at his disposal. With these means, he formed in three months his first army of the Elbe ; two months afterwards, his army of reserve on the Rhine ; and he now garnishes his coasts and frontiers.

All the offers of men, horses and money, which, according to the French papers have

been made him *by the people*, have really been made, but *by the prefects and other administrators in his pay*, and in consequence of orders transmitted from his Ministers*. The affection, which the same papers pretend, has been displayed towards his sacred person, is in fact the most decided hatred, manifested by pamphlets, placards, and epigrams, the favourite weapons of the French. The enthusiasm, the joy, with which the same authority informs us, the conscripts are inspired at their departure for the army, is nothing else but resignation in some, and with others, despair. A correct opinion may be formed of the ardour of these unfortunate youths, when it is known that some have caused themselves to be replaced three times, others have paid twenty thousand francs

* All the Prefects and Under-Prefects, who, at that period, did not display sufficient activity and zeal in causing those orders to be carried into execution, were deprived of their situations. In the papers of the beginning of April, a list of about an hundred promotions may be found, made in consequence of these removals, which have not been otherwise mentioned.

to a substitute, and some given him his *weight in money**.

Buonaparte has no difficulty, however, in carrying on that system of delusion. Supreme master of the press, it only speaks his language. What is more extraordinary, is, that he should still find dupes. For instance, from what the French papers have stated, and what Buonaparte himself has dared to utter before the Legislative Body, in the sitting of February 14th, it would appear that the Pope had signed a Concordat last January, and that pardons had been granted in consequence. The fact is, that the Pope refused to sign any thing, and even to see the Cardinals in Buonaparte's in-

* Respecting the Guards of Honour, the same quackery is used. Undoubtedly some have been offered by their parents, who held situations under Government; but as to the rest, the Prefects send them an order to equip themselves, and to march. No ground of exemption is admitted. Through this means a double object is attained; for it produces both soldiers and hostages. Then the newspapers mention the departments that have distinguished themselves, and designate with particular emphasis the persons of a great name and family, who have caused themselves to be registered. But they forget to add that it was done *by order*.

terest, or at least, that he received very ill those who, without his consent, appeared before him, such as Maury and Camba eres* : that his Holiness is still a prisoner, and that the Italian Cardinals, who formed his council, live still in banishment. But he thus imposed on the French for a fortnight or a month, which was necessary to appease the universal discontent then prevailing ; and the rest of Europe is perhaps still deceived.

At the commencement of the war, 100,000 Frenchmen a year supplied the wants of Na-

* Cardinal Camba eres, on going to Fontainebleau, had announced that he should be made Legate *a latere*. He remained one hour only at Fontainebleau, and returned very little satisfied with his reception. It was publicly reported at Paris, that his Holiness only addressed to him the following sentence :—“ You are a very good *Buonapartian* Frenchman, but a bad Catholic.” I have heard this anecdote related in several towns in France.

I have also been assured, that when the Pope was at Savona, Buonaparte was told that the people considered him as a martyr, and already anticipated his beatification.—“ This man will owe me the obligation of being one day made a saint,” replied Napoleon with affected levity. He thought proper, soon after, however, to transfer his Holiness from Savona to Fontainebleau.

oleon's ambition*. Since the insurrection in Spain, he has required from an hundred and fifty, to two hundred thousand men per annum. In 1812, he raised between 4 and 500,000, and in 1813, at least 700,000 men. The monument to be erected on the Alps states 1,200,000, but this number is exaggerated, unless it be his intention to complete it by the end of the year. As it may be expected, he is detested, but he is obeyed. The scourge in hand, he would make the very last Frenchman march†. He will defeat the Allies, as long as they shall

* The Senate, by a *Senatus Consultum*, places a certain number of men at the disposal of the War Minister. The latter is in no wise confined to that number by the *Senatus Consultum*, which is intended only to blind the public. He takes any number which may be required to complete ancient corps, or form new ones. It would therefore lead us to error to calculate the amount of effective conscripts from that which has been decreed.

† It is known how he accustoms his new levies to bear the fire of the enemy. At the battle of Lutzen they formed his first line, the Imperial guards behind had a hundred pieces of cannon with order to fire grape shot and to kill all those who should fly before the allies.

err as to the means to be employed against him, as long as they shall be the dupes of his perfidiousness, and to his extraordinary and revolutionary measures, will oppose those that are common and regular. I am far from wishing that he should be imitated in the odious parts of his conduct. Justice and moderation can alone lay the foundations of a solid union. But let my voice be heard! Let every foe to that ever-reviving hydra, unite to effect its overthrow! The whole universe will be in arms, it is true, but the conflict will only last one moment. That man's strength lies in our disunion and blindness. We possess a thousand means, and there is nothing to do but to employ them.

It is believed, and frequently asserted, that the Allied Powers, and all the legitimate Governments, can neither adopt the same measures as Buonaparte, nor employ the same means to bring such large armies into the field. This is a mistake. Is it impossible to exert that prodigious activity which forms the basis of his successes? Is it impossible to introduce

the conscription into other states besides France? Is it not established in Holland, Italy, Bavaria and Saxony? Has it not been carried into Poland? By Buonaparte, it is true; but certainly what he has effected with lately conquered nations, by whom he is detested, to enslave the world, may be done in loyal states by a legitimate, long established, and beloved Government, to shield them from slavery, and secure their independence. It would only be necessary to establish the conscription in a regular, just, and impartial manner. I know that it would easily be introduced into Spain, and that the people would adopt it cheerfully. It would not be difficult to establish it in Russia, where the Sovereign authority meets with no opposition, and where the late invasion of the French has inflamed every mind against them. The enthusiasm with which the law of the Landsturm has been received in Prussia, proves, not only the possibility, but the facility of introducing the conscription in that country. As to the levying of extraordinary taxes, it would be as easily

effected, as soon as the people should know that the finances were properly managed, and their sacrifices are only temporary, for they feel their necessity too severely to complain of them.

As Frederick II. of Prussia acquired a great superiority over his neighbours, by introducing new tactics among his troops, and preserved his advantage as long as his antagonists persisted in following the old method, but lost it as soon as they adopted his own; so Buonaparte's career shall be stopped the moment his adversaries will employ means similar to his. He will be overthrown, as soon as any Government shall bring those means to the same degree of perfection he has done. For such an invigorated Government will no longer follow the beaten and ordinary track. It will not remain on the defensive. On the contrary, it will choose its time, and select the place, when and where to inflict a deadly blow.

In the madness of his ambition, Napoleon sets no bound to his desires. Among his friends and supporters, he does not conceal his

intention to erect an universal monarchy*.

He has boasted, that in ten years his family

* All his organization is military, and, it would be vain to attempt to conceal it, tends to that end. If he reigns any considerable period, or if, as he hopes, Providence grant him thirty additional years of life and power, he will have sufficient time to put a finishing hand to his institutions, and Europe will sink under his yoke; the spirit of the French will change, and that people, deprived of all trade, and accustomed to privations, will learn no other art than that of war. The generation that rises under Buonaparte has no education but a military one. Lycea are established in every province, and private schools for the instruction of youth are forbidden, or, at least, are only allowed to receive the overplus of boys, which the Lycea cannot contain. But even then, schoolmasters are obliged to send their pupils to the classes held in the Lycea, and to make them wear the same uniforms. There, they get up, go to bed, and do all their exercises by beat of drum. All are instructed in the management of arms: their walks, made in a regular order, are as many military parades, executed like those of the troops, and after the same words of command. They are all divided into grenadiers, chasseurs or fusileers, serjeants, corporals, drummers, or privates, and wear all the distinguishing marks of their respective corps and rank, in virtue of which they enjoy certain prerogatives and authority over their fellow-students. Thus the whole of the middle classes are obliged to give a military education to their children, and it is out of those classes that the national spirit is formed. Moreover, the military being the only road to places and

would be the oldest amongst the reigning Houses in Europe. Notwithstanding his reverses, which he considers as some of the com-

honours, is naturally followed by most individuals. And in reality most of the administrative situations are given to old veterans, and those in the Custom-house, as well as those belonging to the administration of forests and lands, are exclusively reserved for them. All the daughters of the officers and soldiers who have perished on the field of battle, are by right educated and portioned at their marriage, at the expence of the Government, and this is really done, their number not being very considerable, as but few of the military men are married. Their sons are also taken care of, and form a ready supply of soldiers. Let it not be thought, however, that these numerous pupils cost the Government much. A Lyceum contains three hundred youths: one hundred are Government pupils and pay nothing, but the rest pay one-third more than what is required for themselves, and all expences are thus provided for. There is no way of eluding these regulations, unless children are allowed to go without any education whatever. The navy is not, on this account, neglected. Every year, several ships of the line are built, and 20,000 boys, of the age of 14, are raised in the maritime departments, and exercised in the bays and along the shores. The sea-gunners have been increased, and formed into regiments, and that corps, well organized and disciplined, served to replace the artillery regiments destroyed in Russia. Should Buonaparte have patience enough to wait ten years without sending any ship out of his harbours, he would then have a navy equal to that of England in the number of his vessels and that of his sailors.

mon chances of war, convinced that nothing can resist him, he despises, equally, both sovereigns and nations, and the French still more than any other people. Whenever the public opinion is most decided against him, he seizes that opportunity of degrading his subjects still lower, by exacting from them the basest flattery. When, at the end of December last, he reached Paris as a fugitive, after having abandoned the remains of the unfortunate army which his imprudence and improvidence had caused to perish among the snows of Russia, he made all the constituted bodies, and the principal towns in France, send him deputations, by whom speeches, secretly dictated to them, were publicly pronounced, which it is impossible to read without pity and indignation. Does he not also evince the contempt which he feels for the French, by his inhumanity towards his own prisoners, so long detained in Spain and in England, and whom his obstinacy alone keeps away from their country? Finding in the conscription an inexhaustible mine of men, he thinks that an exchange of prisoners would be

advantageous to his enemies, who, he fancies, cannot repair their losses with as much facility. He is mistaken. Spain, at least, boasts as many soldiers to fight him, as she counts men able to bear arms. Nevertheless, led away by that notion, he will suffer those unfortunate prisoners, whom he calls his subjects, as a reward for their services, to spend in prison the most precious years of their existence, deaf to the reclamations and the entreaties of their families.

But does he ever condescend to consult public opinion, and seek what promotes the interests and the happiness of France? What is more odious, more impolitic, and more contrary to the general wishes of his people, than his war against Spain? A weak and contemptible ministry placed at his disposal the army, the navy, the finances, and all the resources of that noble country. What more could he require? Undoubtedly he must have wished to divide for ever two nations long united by the closest friendship! or, as he expresses himself, he wished to tear another crown from the respectable and illustrious family, which may

now reproach itself with having cherished that serpent in its bosom, with having protected his youth, and unfolded by education the talents which he now exerts to desolate mankind.

And yet, after all, what are those talents? Do not all his great actions bear the stamp of the most decided madness? What can we say of that Egyptian expedition, which cost France forty millions, forty thousand men, fifteen sail of the line, and the friendship of the Turks? Shall we praise the Spanish war, which, in six years, has cost him twelve hundred millions, six hundred thousand men, and a most advantageous alliance? Can Buonaparte himself deem his late attack on Russia more reasonable? Did he not make it in opposition to every principle of sound policy and of common sense, which unite in declaring that no war should be undertaken, until you have previously closed that in which you were engaged, especially when the two wars are waged in countries so distant, and against Powers as formidable as Russia, and Spain united with England. Shall we commend the imprisonment of the Pope, that of Ferdinand VII. or the murder of the

Duke d'Enghien? In putting this question, I do not consider those actions under a moral, but a political point of view. Shall we approve of the union of Holland, and a great part of Italy and Germany to France? Since this event is France happier? Are her taxes grown less? Is her independence seated on firmer foundations? No, certainly; will be the answer made to all these interrogatories. Well then, that phantom so highly praised by his admirers, that towering genius has vanished, and there only remains a madman, but the most dangerous of all madmen.

But the world is already, in a great measure, undeceived. Buonaparte is known and detested, and more so in France than any where else, because he is there better known, and it is impossible he should be, without exciting both contempt and hate. But when the French became acquainted with his real character, they had allowed him to take too overawing an attitude to be able to overthrow him as they wished. Except certain individuals enriched with the spoils of the people; they are tired of making conquests. They feel no wish to pro-

serve the countries which the Usurper has united to his empire. They would prefer, on the contrary, to remain within their former limits, which are extensive enough to enable them to maintain their independence. But however disgusted they may be with the new order of things, they cannot disguise from themselves the hatred with which the conduct of their armies, in conquered countries, has inspired surrounding nations. The dread of retaliation, and especially that of seeing France partitioned and ravaged, far more powerful than the despotism of the tyrant, unites and detains them under his banners. They know neither where, nor round whom, but him, to rally. In their distressed state they turn their eyes towards their legitimate sovereign, and feel that his return would be the harbinger of peace and happiness. But they also feel, that in a change of this nature, his presence alone could save them from a new revolution, and a new anarchy still worse than the yoke under which they groan.

From what has been stated respecting Buonaparte, and his conduct towards both foreigners

and the French, his perfidiousness in his relation with other Powers, and with individuals, or rather, after the sufferings he has inflicted on mankind, every one must be convinced, that from his situation and by principle, he must be hostile to all legitimate governments, and to every individual attached to his country and his sovereign. It cannot, therefore, be doubted, but his rule is incompatible with the safety of Europe, and the independence of the neighbouring governments and nations. From such premises, only one conclusion can be drawn: all must unite to deprive him of his noxious power.

What means will lead to that wished-for end? I know them: but it is not in a work intended for the public eye that they ought to be detailed. Though adopted by all governments, if once known to the enemy, they would become useless. If rejected, he would laugh at my vain efforts. Under every point of view, therefore, I must remain silent. I have said enough to enable statesmen to know, and to do what is proper in the present situation of Europe.

APPENDIX.

Letters of the Commander in Catalonia, Marquis de Campo Verde, to General Contreras, Governor of Tarragona, during the siege of that place.

No. I.

“ Montblanc, June 12, 1811.

“ MY DEAR FRIEND,

“ Be assured that with the shortest delay possible I shall come to your relief, and therefore maintain yourself with resolution. What you have done since I left Tarragona, can only be credited by those who have witnessed it. It is inconceivable how many attempts the enemy has made to sow division between us, but I have defeated them all.”

“ Montblanc, June 22, 1811.

“ MY DEAR FRIEND,

“ Baron d'Eroles arrived last night, his division will follow him to day, and we shall instantly begin manœuvring, as I shall inform you. Velasco is not yet come, but since he is already on his march, we shall set off, not to have to wait. I am glad that you are preparing the streets, so as to create fresh obstacles to the enemy. I long ardently to present myself in sight of your place. Meanwhile command what you please to your best friend who, &c. &c.

“Villarordona, June 23, 1811.

“To-morrow, at the dawn of day, the troops shall move from hence in two divisions. The one, consisting of five thousand infantry and seven hundred horse, will march through Villavella and will attack the camps of the enemy at Palleresos and Hostalrou, which will first present themselves to our front. The other will take part at Le Caslar, that it may serve as a corps of reserve. It will send an advanced-guard to support the assailing column and cover its left flank. During this attack, your Lordship will make a sortie from the town, at the moment you will perceive our fire, or any movement among the enemy's troops, whom you will attack in front or on his left flank, in order that our operation may be crowned with the greatest advantages, and fulfill the proposed object. God preserve your Lordship many years, &c.”

“Vendrell, June 25, 1811.

“I ordered, yesterday, Field-Marshal Don Joseph Miranda, to attack the enemy's camp at Palleresos, and afterwards the others placed on the chain of mountains that leads to Olivo. He could not carry that operation into effect, on account of some obstacles which he seems to have encountered. I have therefore sent provisions for his men, and directed him to change his movement as the enemy might have discovered our intention, and to take a new position during the night, in order, that the day after to-morrow, between

six and seven o'clock in the morning, he may attack on this side. On my part, I shall employ every means to obtain a successful result, which I dare not promise, considering the quality of the troops of which our assailing division is composed. God preserve your Lordship many years, &c."

"Vendrell, June 27, 1811.

"Since no other resource is left to save the place, in the state to which it is reduced, but to risk a general action, I am resolved on attempting it. But having little confidence in some of the troops of which the division is composed, which are new levies, and seeing that the deliverance of the town and of the province depends on the result of that action, I desire your Lordship to cause three thousand of your best soldiers to embark this night and join me here. Among those will be comprised the corps of Almeria and Hibernia. You will then have a garrison of 5,000 men, a sufficient force to enable your Lordship to make a sortie at the moment you perceive our movement. I inform you beforehand, that I charge you with the responsibility of causing this order to be executed. God preserve, &c. &c."

P. S. The 4,000 men whom I have directed your Lordship to cause to land at Vendrell, arrived yesterday at Tarragona. I have just been informed of it, and have learnt that they are English troops. This last arrived force must be united to the 4,000 men whom I have asked of your Lordship in the first part of this official letter. Send rather more

than less for an operation, on which hangs the fate of the principality.

No. II.

The treatment of the prisoners of war who attempted to escape, was so arbitrary and revolting, that to silence the public clamours it excited, Buonaparte has published the following law.

“ COUNCIL OF STATE.

“ *Extract from the Register of the deliberations in the Sitting of April 28, 1812.*

“ PROCLAMATION.

“ The Council of State, in obedience to the directions given by his Majesty, has heard the report of the war department, having for object to examine whether officers, made prisoners of war, who, after having broken their parole, are retaken fighting against France, ought to be tried before a military commission. Considering, that those officers have abused the laws of honour, and thereby subjected themselves once more to those of war, the Council are of opinion—That, when officers, prisoners of war, having broken their parole, are retaken fighting against France, capital punishment thus incurred by them, may not be inflicted upon them, except they have been tried by a military commission, appointed to identify their persons and the reality of the facts.

“ The present Proclamation shall be inserted in the Bulletin of Laws.

" This is a true extract—The Secretary General
of the Council of State.

(Signed) " T. G. LOCRÉ.

" Approved at the Palace of St. Cloud, May 4,
1812.

(Signed) " NAPOLEON.

" By the Emperor, the Minister Secretary of
State.

(Signed) " Count DARU."

Officers who make their escape from the depots
of prisoners of war, and are so unfortunate as to
be retaken, before they can reach their country,
are confined, and treated as private soldiers.

POSTSCRIPT,

It may be seen by the preceding account, that the pupils of the Lyceums cost nothing to Buonaparte, and that, in reality, their education is paid by their fellow-students. The weddings celebrated *on festivals* are not more expensive to him. He decrees that in each department a certain number of military men, retired from service, shall each receive a wife with a dowry, as a recompence for their services. The *Prefects* makes the allotment according to the number of *Sub-prefectures*; the *Sub-prefects* according to the number of cantons; and, lastly, the *Communes*, through the means of some centimes added to the usual taxes, furnish the dowries in question. This additional money is levied without specifying for what it is to be employed, those who pay it know not why; the Administrators alone are in the secret, the soldiers think they owe gratitude to Government, whose desired end is thus accomplished.

I have been assured that those soldiers, who by their wounds or other infirmities acquired in battle, are totally incapacitated for service,

and have no other means of subsistence than the pay of invalids, are sent to Bruys in Holland, and to other depôts, where the insalubrity of the air every day diminishes their number.

When, last year, Buonaparte disappeared from his Grand Army, it was thought that he was lost, and an immense number of anecdotes and witticisms got into circulation, many of whom are already known. With the following fact, however, only those initiated into the mysteries of the Court of the Thuilleries, are acquainted. The Empress, terrified at finding herself left at the mercy of the very men who had doomed her aunt to the scaffold, wished immediately to set off for Vienna. To quiet her apprehensions and prevent her departure, the Arch-Chancellor, Cambačeres, was obliged to sleep at St. Cloud until Buonaparte returned.

Among the placards which were stuck up at Paris at the same period, the following deserves to be known, on account of the influence it has had, and still has, on Buonaparte's conduct.

In the centre of the ancient place Vendome, he has caused to be erected a column, similar to the Trojan Pillar at Rome, on which is placed a statue of himself. One morning the following words were found fixed to the base of

the column:—*Tyrant, if the torrents of human blood thou hast caused to be shed were collected in this place, thou mightest quench thy thirst with it at pleasure, without even bending thine head.*

This placard was immediately torn off and taken to Buonaparte: it affected him deeply, though in general he pretends to laugh at the caricatures that are made against him, and often repeats the words of Montesquieu:—“That the French are consoled for the loss of a battle when they have made a song on the General.”—This placard, however, appeared to him of a more serious nature. The next day he told those who were most in his confidence, that he wished for peace, and that he would have it before the end of the year. “I shall beat them,” said he, speaking of the Russians and Prussians, “I shall beat them two or three times, and they will sign a peace. As for the English and the Spaniards, they will never do us any great harm.” He has grossly deceived himself with regard to the south! Will his prediction relative to the north be accomplished?

A man of observation, who has read this little work in MSS. thinks that the statement respecting the Concordat will appear incredible.

And well may an Englishman, who has the happiness of living under a free Government, hesitate to believe that it is possible to sport so openly with an assembly, which is considered as the representative body of a great nation, and to carry impudence so far, as to deceive it with an account of the successful issue of a transaction of such importance, when it has in fact no existence whatever. Yet nothing is more certain, as the following arguments will prove.

It was most important for Buonaparte that he should substantiate the assertion he had made to the Senate, by some public act on the part of the Pope, which would demonstrate the reality of their good intelligence. Yet, since the 25th of January, whence Buonaparte has dated the signing of the pretended Concordat, his Holiness has made no public act, either as a Sovereign or a Pontiff.

The dignitaries of the Church, and the other ministers of religion, have long since been rendered too insignificant to allow their confinement or banishment to awaken much attention. But the eyes of the Catholic world are turned towards his Holiness, and seek him in vain. Where is he? If at liberty, wherefore does not Buonaparte suffer him to appear?

On setting off to begin the Russian cam-

paign in 1812, Buonaparte told his Arch-Chancellor Camba eres, that he expected to find the affair with the Pope settled at his return. In consequence, his Holiness saw himself dragged from Savona to Fontainebleau ; but in vain. When Buonaparte returned, nothing was concluded. Hence came the *unexpected* visit paid by the Court to Fontainebleau in the course of the winter. Some conferences undoubtedly took place. His captive Holiness cannot prevent his persecutors from penetrating into his presence. But *if all the differences were ended*, as Buonaparte asserted in his speech to the Legislative Body on the 14th of February, the Pope would appear, which he does not. No new Concordat has therefore been signed.

THE END.